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ABSTRACT
Our contribution describes a reorientation in the intelligibility of governance
practices authorised under international law. Observing the World Bank, we
narrate new managerial attitudes and organisational routines that exhibit
heightened ‘risk appetites’. Risk and complexity are no longer seen as
limiting conditions on the institutional project, but as co-constitutive
elements and constructive tools, including new sets of heuristics aimed at
governing with and through contingency and unknowability. The practices
that we observe are characterised by adaptive, iterative and recursive
routines, flexibly attuned to immanent possibilities and aims of resilience. We
situate these changes in a genealogy of governmentality, focusing on the
relation to a ‘surplus of life’, or unruly elements of populations that
persistently escape productive incorporation into the closure of institutional
programmes. The World Bank’s turn to resilience as a particular rationality of
reform signals an institutional attempt to enrol what has escaped prior
efforts at determinate institutional intervention.
KEYWORDS World Bank; risk; resilience; governmentality; surplus of life
Oedipus and the wellness guru
Our contribution to this special issue takes off from questions raised in this
symposium about the impossibility of closure in institutional contexts exhi-
biting features associated with un-governance. Closure refers in this context
to the orientation of institutional practices towards ‘determinate and mobile
artefacts’1 deployable for pre-defined governance purposes, such as bench-
marks, exchangeable models and rules of general applicability. The impossi-
bility of closure, in turn, refers to a recognition in institutional practice of
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‘the inescapably fragile, contingent, interested, [and] indeterminate nature’
of those formerly determinate and mobile artefacts, leading to the recog-
nition of the ‘ultimate practical impossibility of matching institutional struc-
tures with desired outcomes’.2 The impossibility of closure reflects radical
complexity in certain domains of global governance, such that institution-
building will only produce ‘ever-more complex effects’ despite an insti-
tutional mission to ‘govern or regulate complexity in the world’.3 Moreover,
the impossibility of closure is not merely an abstract observation, but
‘emerges as a mundane and routine part of the performance of institution-
building practices’ –whether in moments of misrecognition and miscommu-
nication, or an acknowledgment of limited competence, etc –manifesting the
constraints of bounded knowledge.4 Our interest in these phenomena, in
keeping with the introduction to this special issue, is not in the reflexive
awareness of these knowledge-limitations exhibited by institutional actors
as they nonetheless carry out their institutional practices despite the limit-
ations.5 Rather, with the editors of this special issue, we are interested in
the ways in which such limitations, hesitations or awareness of things
lacking are positively mobilised for governance purposes, especially insofar
as they are recently deployed in deliberate relation and even productive
tension with familiar practices and notions associated with closure in a tra-
ditional institutional sense.
A close relationship between law and a defining (or constitutive) lack is
not new,6 but our analysis here proceeds from the possibility that the
terms of that relationship have changed. Staging our analysis, we use two
archetypal characters to tell a story about the World Bank, namely
Oedipus and the wellness guru. This register signals the importance of nar-
rating un-governance in material as well as psychoanalytic terms.7 Oedipus,
in this register, is the classic symbol for the ‘agency of prohibition’ behind
law’s traditional posture of constraint, which includes cabining and setting
off limits to the unknown.8 In this latter respect, the character maintains a
prohibition that is both inflexible and seemingly superfluous: barring




5 We are not, for example, performing Sloterdijk’s critique of cynical reason. See Peter Sloterdijk, Critique
of Cynical Reason (University of Minnesota Press, 1988).
6 It can be found in work from Kelsen’s grundnorm to Derrida’s foundational violence, and points beyond
and in between. Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (University of California Press, 1960); Jacques Derrida,
‘Force of Law: “The Mystical Foundation of Authority”’ in Drucilla Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld, and David
Gray Carlson (eds), Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice (Routledge, 1992).
7 We use here a Lacanian psychoanalytic vocabulary that comes by way of Žižek, drawing principally on
Slavoj Žižek, For They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment as a Political Factor (Verso, 2002).
8 Žižek (n 7) 266; cf, Jacques Lacan, ‘A Theoretical Introduction to the Functions of Psychoanalysis in
Criminology’, in Jacques Lacan (ed), Écrits (WW Norton and Company, 2006).
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cannot be accessed or overcome) in the first place. In short, the oedipal figure
activates the defining lack commonly (if variously) associated with law,
‘transforming the inherent impossibility of its [knowledge or] satisfaction
into prohibition’.9 The wellness guru, healthful and flexible popular media
success, is a counterpart symbol that we propose to stand for contemporary
attempts to get beyond the formal oedipal prohibition, aiming not to cabin
the unknown but to access it for positive, productive purposes.10 The oedipal
figure attains to order with discipline. The wellness guru attains to pro-
ductivity by other means, generating surplus value out of attunement to
immanent conditions in the world at large, production that is unattainable
by Oedipus.11 The wellness guru thereby exhibits a technologically mediated
adaptive immediacy, keyed to resilience that is achieved not by imposing or
adhering to a fixed order, but by exploiting material conditions according to
information in and of the moment. We perceive the wellness guru as symbol
for a new normative architecture of un-governance, and so will flesh out the
figure as we proceed. Institutionally, as our narrative of transformations at
theWorld Bank instantiates, a turn to the wellness guru is visible in the aban-
donment of formal frames of legal evaluation or decision-making. The cul-
tivation of new managerial attitudes and organisational routines display a
heightened ‘risk appetite’ as well as a new set of heuristics aimed at coping
(and governing) with and through contingency and unknowability.
Simultaneous to this shift in frames of legal reasoning, we observe a
remarkable reorientation in the intelligibility of governance practices author-
ised under law. We examine these changes in governance practices through a
Foucauldian analytic of governmentality keyed to resilience. We situate the
changes we observe in the genealogy of governmentality that Foucault
sketches, and focus specifically on the relation he draws between governmen-
tality and a ‘surplus of life’, or the unruly elements of populations that per-
sistently escape productive incorporation into the closure of institutional
programmes.12 Recognising the impossibility of closure associated with
9 Žižek (n 7) 266.
10 In its embrace of uncertainty as productive possibility, the image of the wellness guru intersects with
other psychological prototypes in literature (particularly in relation to the entrepreneurial embrace of
risk). Knight’s classic text, for example, refers to the figure of the ‘adventurer’ – a figure traditionally
associated with corporate life. Yet, with Amoore, we see an extension of this ‘adventuring spirit’ in
current practices of (un-)governance where ‘the unknowable environment is to be embraced, posi-
tively invited, for its intrinsic possibilities’. See Frank Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (Houghton
Mifflin Company, 1921) 311; Louise Amoore, The Politics of Possibility (Duke University Press, 2013) 10.
11 This corresponds with Foucault’s dichotomy between the sovereign (the oedipal figure) ‘who can say
no to any individual’s desire’ and the ‘economic-political thought of the physiocrats’ for whom the
‘problem is how they can say yes to this desire’ by finding ways to ‘live dangerously’ amid the
ever emergent and unpredictable externalities of life. In Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lec-
tures at the Collège de France 1978–1979 (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). Latour refers to this as the attu-
nement to the ‘externalities of modernity’. See Bruno Latour, ‘Is Re-modernization Occurring—And If
So, How to Prove It?: A Commentary on Ulrich Beck’ (2003) 20(2) Theory, Culture & Society 35.
12 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977–1978 (Palgrave
Macmillan, 2009).
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un-governance, the World Bank’s turn to resilience as a particular rationality
of reform signals an institutional attempt to enrol what has escaped efforts at
determinate institutional intervention. This will be manifest in the use at the
World Bank of adaptive, iterative and recursive routines that are flexibly
attuned to immanent possibilities in the subjects and objects of governance.
In this situation, surplus and complexity are no longer seen as ‘limit to the
world of governmental reason but [as] the basis for governmental reason
itself’.13 Risk and resilience thereby emerge as co-constitutive elements in
the adoption of governance tools positively mobilised around the ‘impossi-
bility of closure’.
The World Bank as a site of un-governance
We empirically instantiate the turn to un-governance with reference to the
World Bank’s embrace of criminal justice reform – and security sector
reform more generally – in the past decade. Two (rather simultaneous) insti-
tutional transformations defined the expansion of theWorld Bank’s mandate
and operational engagement in this domain: the replacement of traditional
(read: prohibitive) practices of legal evaluation, interpretation and
decision-making with performative practices of risk-management, on the
one hand, and the adoption of a mode of governance oriented towards the
enhancement of local resilience, on the other. In dialogue, these transform-
ations display a deferral of foundational questions on both the legal nature of
institutional authority and the causal determinants of socio-political change.
They can be qualified as instances of un-governance insofar as they demon-
strate a highly productive attunement to conditions of contingency and
unknowability in material practices of institutional reform oriented
around generally framed aspirational objectives.14 Expressive of broader
changes in contemporary practices of governance that operate under con-
ditions of not-knowing,15 the institutional templates of risk and resilience
signal the emergence of routines, tools and techniques oriented around
immanence (rather than transcendence); experimentation (rather than
imposition); and open-endedness (rather than teleological determination).
Against this backdrop of developments at the World Bank, we observe a
double movement arguably in keeping with the (productive) tension
13 See David Chandler, Ontopolitics in the Anthropocene: An Introduction to Mapping, Sensing and Hacking
(Routledge, 2018) 37. Chandler describes this as a shift from modernist modes of reform to the ‘onto-
politics of mapping’. In a way that perfectly resonates with the World Bank’s turn to resilience
explored below, Chandler describes the mode of governance of ‘mapping’ as a form of ‘systemic adap-
tation to emergent social, economic and environmental conditions’. This differs from the ‘linear
problem of optimizing scarce resources’. Ibid, 50
14 Desai and Lang (n 1).
15 Fleur Johns, ‘From Planning to Prototypes: New Ways of Seeing like a State’ (2019) 82(5) Modern Law
Review 833. Johns focuses on new ‘styles’ of governance more attuned to inferential sensing than
comprehensive knowing.
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between closure and the impossibility of closure. On the one hand, the prac-
tices we describe constitute a radical departure from previous modes of
liberal rule. On the other hand, we situate their performance in a longer gen-
ealogy of governmentality designed to make populations more productive
for competitive purposes by making social complexity legible and available
for capture in newmaterial registers of governance.16 The new tools, routines
and heuristics we discuss did not emanate from fixed templates for socio-
political governance and change. Instead, they overtly broke from a teleologi-
cal script for institutional action. The absence of institutional ideal-types,
endpoints and foundations is a constant feature in this assemblage of refor-
mist techniques and rationalities. The getting-beyond of these structuring
features promises a new or expanded field of opportunity, a making-pro-
ductive of untapped conditions immanent in the (social) world at large.
The unstructured, unknown or un-governed – including the Foucauldian
surplus of life – does not figure here as a constraint on governance but
rather as conduit and constitutive condition.17 This constitutive dimension
corresponds with an embrace of the impossibility of closure, as part of a
move towards un-governance structures of adaptive utility and resilience.18
In the account of the World Bank, Oedipus is at work in the background
as a figure holding together a traditional notion of law for practical purposes,
representing a foundational but ongoing intervention to sustain the entirety
of a formal structure.19 According to this intervention, the mission of law is
predicated on containing what remains unknown and so achieve closure. In
this sense, the unknown or unknowable is constitutive of law, even as law
prohibits access to it. But at a stroke, the law defines in a formal sense – it
gives form to – the constitutive void that cannot be known. In this light,
16 This aligns with the analysis of Duffield, who qualifies new infrastructures of data connectivity as
essential for the functioning and acceleration of global security governance, which he places in a
longer genealogy of liberal rule. See Mark Duffield, ‘The Resilience of the Ruins: Towards a Critique
of Digital Humanitarianism’ (2016) 4(3) Resilience: International Politics, Practices and Discourses 165
(‘[T]he development-security nexus has pivoted from the ground into the volumetric and vertical
dimensions of a buccaneering digital atmosphere’).
17 We refer to the ‘surplus of life’ in Foucauldian terms as the multiplicity of emergent social elements
that escape productive incorporation in institutional programmes. In Foucault (n 12). From the per-
spective of object-oriented ontology, ‘this surplus is not something that… lurks beneath the
human symbolic order, as in Lacan’s… sense of “the Real,” but is always a form that can never be
fully translated into any set of relations’. Graham Harman, ‘The Only Exit From Modern Philosophy’
(2020) 3(1) Open Philosophy 143.
18 We are inspired here by work that places the embrace of resilience in a longer lineage of governmen-
tality. See Jessica Schmidt, ‘Intuitively Neoliberal? Towards a Critical Understanding of Resilience Gov-
ernance’ (2015) 21(2) European Journal of International Relations 402; Jeremy Walker and Melinda
Cooper, ‘Genealogies of Resilience: From Systems Ecology to the Political Economy of Crisis Adap-
tation’ (2011) 42(2) Security Dialogue 143; David Chandler, ‘Beyond Neoliberalism: Resilience, the
New Art of Governing Complexity’ (2014) 2(1) Resilience: International Politics, Practices and Discourses
47, 47 (arguing that, in contrast to ‘actually existing neoliberalism’, ‘resilience asserts a flatter ontology
of interactive emergence’).
19 In Lacanian terms, we describe Oedipus as point de capiton. See Žižek (n 7) 16–27; Slavoj Žižek, The
Sublime Object of Ideology (Verso, 1989) 109ff.
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the law is an intervention, violent and lawless in the first instance like any
other intervention, but the one ongoing intervention that achieves the pro-
hibition of any further intervention.20 Oedipus’s law turns what is not or
cannot be known into what must not be known. Further, there is an impor-
tant temporal aspect to such an intervention: it is always retrospective, com-
municating from the first instance an order that always already exists.21 Our
argument here is that un-governance likewise is intelligible as part of an
order that already exists, a temporal order organised according to escalating
competition and ever more productivity without object or end (the disposi-
tif). The figure of the wellness guru holds together the new formal insti-
tutional mandate appropriate for practical purposes to this condition. In
contrast to Oedipus’s intervention, however, the wellness guru turns what
is not or cannot be known into what must be exploited. In this way, the well-
ness guru attains to closure by embracing its impossibility.
Thus, the move to un-governance within an institutional context still
committed to closure, such as the World Bank, involves a radical move to
incorporate the surplus of life that has historically escaped successive
modes of governance. In this sense, the mobilisation to exploit even the
surplus of life is constitutive of the move to un-governance, a continuation
of a genealogy of governmentality but also a break from prior modes. The
continuation and the break both consist of the embrace of the elusive, con-
tingent possibilities encompassed within the multifariousness of a popu-
lation. The confrontation, then, between the constant escape of the surplus
of life and the development of the technologies and tools of modern govern-
ance designed to contain it is one factor to explain governmentality keyed to
the contingent and emergent in this register of un-governance. These funda-
mental tensions track and elaborate on the tensions sketched in the introduc-
tion to this special issue. They also arguably call for a shift from
representational to performative modes of critique that do not take the tech-
nology of risk as a (potentially flawed) map of reality, but focuses on its ‘pro-
ductive work’ in constituting new objects of knowledge, templates of
institutional practice, managerial subjectivities and rationalities of
reform.22 We will instantiate immediately below the development and
deployment of destabilising techniques at the World Bank that do not
20 Cf. Žižek (n 7) 31–34.
21 Ibid, 16–20
22 This shift from representational to performative modes of analysis is inspired by Andrew Lang, ‘Inter-
national Lawyers and the Study of Expertise: Representationalism and Performativity’ in Moshe Hirsch
and Andrew Lang (eds), Research Handbook on the Sociology of International Law (Edward Elgar Pub-
lishing 2018). Inspired by Johns’ observation on the shift from ‘planning to prototypes’, Lang calls for a
mode of critique going beyond ‘denaturalization, rehistoricization, decoding’ and employs the per-
spective of performativity to ask a different range of questions: ‘what productive work do [knowledge
practices] do as they circulate? What forms of social action are they able to mobilize and how? What
subjects, objects, and situations are produced in the manner of their circulation and deployment, and
how?’ For Lang, expertise is ‘less about producing objective common sense, and more about the
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pretend to observe fixed models or maps of reality –models or maps that cri-
tique might once have shown up for their shortcomings – but are performa-
tively linked to immanent possibility associated with an elusive surplus of
life. The object of our analysis as part of this special issue is to contribute
to a new stream of critique trained on the productive power apparent in
this new mode of governance.
A ‘new normative framework’ – introducing the organisational
routine of risk management
The first empirical thread of the article is focused on the way that the World
Bank’s turn to criminal justice and security reform was legally justified and
rationalised. The analysis is centred around the displacement of prohibitory
legal considerations through the development of a ‘new normative architec-
ture’ (described as a ‘paradigm shift’ by former General Counsel Leroy).23 In
this context, we retrace salient changes in the practice of lawyering and the
processes of internal legal evaluation in the World Bank, where the deforma-
lised technology of risk-management replaced traditional legal hermeneu-
tics, conceived as constraints or prohibitions. These changes align with the
frame of our analysis insofar as they are centred around the shift from
‘rules to principles’ and from ‘risk avoidance to risk management’ as the
new paradigm for legal interpretation.24 This ‘new normative architecture’
also aimed to cultivate a particular prototype of the institutional lawyer: a
pragmatic, managerial type who has traded the binary and prohibitive
logic of (il)legality for a calculative and adaptive multiplicity of novel tech-
niques to manage contingency and unknowability.
Criminal justice reform and engagement with the security sector of states
had traditionally been seen as legally off-limits for the Bank. In 1997, Sureda
– who was one of the leading figures in the legal department during the era of
Shihata (General Counsel from 1983 to 1998) – had drafted an opinion
which expressed that ‘police power is an expression of the sovereign, political
power of a state over all persons and things’ and that, for this reason,
‘financing of police expenditures, as a class, would not be consistent with a
reasonable reading of the Bank’s Articles’.25 ‘Appraisal of police activities’,
the opinion continued, ‘would necessarily require the World Bank to take
into account political and other non-economic consideration and would
practical work of organizing action despite skepticism… as well as the bracketing of epistemological
differences’ (at 149).
23 See World Bank LVP, Annual Report FY 2013: The World Bank’s Engagement in the Criminal Justice Sector
and the Role of Lawyers in the ‘Solutions Bank’ (World Bank, 2013) (referred to below as ‘LVP Annual
Report 2013’).
24 Ibid
25 Andres Rigo Sureda, ‘Eligibility of Police Expenditures for Bank Financing’ (1997) (Copy on file with
author).
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not be consistent with the prohibition of political activity’.26 ‘[T]he Bank’,
Sureda stipulated, ‘is not an organization to serve all purposes but only
those specifically included in the Articles’ and should refrain from engaging
in this operational domain.27 This categorical prohibition resonates with the
figure of Oedipus – law appears in its rigid, binary form: a formal delineation
of what could reasonably be brought under the reformist ambit of the World
Bank. Simultaneously, this legal intervention – described by Leroy as epitom-
ising the ‘old’, ‘traditional’ and ‘risk-averse’ mode of lawyering – equally
entailed an expression of the World Bank’s political authority (and its juri-
dical boundaries) as derived from a foundational, formal legal act of sover-
eign delegation.28
This ‘traditional’ and prohibitive approach, Leroy lamented, had been
‘interpreted as a complete bar to engagement in the criminal justice
sector’.29 As a clear expression of the entrepreneurial logic that underpinned
the core of her legal intervention, she argued that this orthodox practice of
‘drawing a “bright line” between the permissible and the impermissible’
had created an excessive ‘opportunity cost’ for the World Bank.30 Leroy, a
graduate from the French Ecole Normale d’Administration (ENA) who per-
ceived her role as ‘allowing this institution to adapt’,31 perceived an urgent
need to dismantle these prohibitory, outdated evaluations in her 2012 legal
memorandum on criminal justice reform.32 ‘[O]ne traditional view in the
Bank has it that criminal justice is… essentially an exercise of sovereign
power’, the opinion observes, claiming instead that ‘our understanding of
the criminal justice sector has evolved decisively… The sector is now seen
as provider of public services’.33 Considering that the criminal justice
sector is seen as merely a ‘provider of public services’ (rather than the
expression of state sovereignty), the opinion provides that ‘a blanket prohi-
bition on Bank involvement in the sector on political interference grounds
would be overly broad’.34 Subsequently, and even more significantly, the
opinion expresses that the logic of legality ‘need not be binary’ and that ‘pol-
itical interference’ is not a label assigned to particular domains of state
reform but a ‘risk that could be managed’.35
26 Ibid
27 Ibid
28 On the tenets, cultivation and institutional effects of ‘traditional’ approach, see Dimitri Van Den
Meerssche, ‘Performing the Rule of Law in International Organizations: Ibrahim Shihata and the
World Bank’s turn to Governance Reform’ (2019) 32(1) Leiden Journal of International Law 47.
29 LVP Annual Report 2013 (n 23) 93.
30 Ibid, 93, 94.
31 Interview with Anne-Marie Leroy (Washington DC, October 2016).
32 Anne-Marie Leroy, Legal Note on Bank Involvement in the Criminal Justice Sector (9 February 2012)
(copy on file with author) (referred to below as ‘Leroy Criminal Justice Opinion’).
33 Ibid, para 22
34 Ibid, para 26
35 Ibid, para 34
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In Leroy’s turn away from a ‘binary’, prohibitive logic to adaptive ‘man-
agement strategies’, we witness the core of what the memorandum describes
as a decisive ‘paradigm shift’ in legal practice.36 This shift in practice was pro-
moted both materially (through the introduction of new templates of assess-
ment and evaluation) and subjectively (through the cultivation of new
professional attitudes). In justifying the organisation’s embrace of security
sector reform, Leroy thereby enacted a categorical rejection of the mode of
law through which Shihata had perceived and constructed his institutional
authority: a legal practice consistently aiming at delineating clear ‘boundaries’
between the legal and illegal, the ‘permissible and impermissible’.37 The struc-
turing device of the ‘old’ legal framework was a dichotomy between political
sovereignty and international institutional authority, which aligned with the
image of the World Bank as intergovernmental entity operating under inter-
national law and always at risk of acting ultra vires. By intervening – in the
nature of the wellness guru’s intervention, which supplants the oedipal attitude
– to qualify states as both clients (of theWorld Bank) and providers of services
(towards its citizens), the old structuring device was disabled and replaced by a
managerial technology of risk aimed at both the management of and pro-
ductive engagement with contingency.38
This new ideal of lawyering aligned with President Jim Yong Kim’s call to
increase the ‘risk appetite’ and sharpen the entrepreneurial spirit of the Bank’s
senior management.39 As Leroy argued, this did not entail the introduction or
rejection of particular legal norms or doctrines, but, rather, implied both a pro-
fessional reorientation and recourse to a novel set of evaluative tools: the need
to ‘instill and nurture a culture of informed risk-taking’ and to ‘build an insti-
tutional architecture for informed risk management’.40 ‘[L]awyers will have a
crucial role to play’, Leroy elaborates, ‘but a different one than before, requir-
ing a different approach to legal issues’ supported by ‘a new concept of our
normative architecture’.41 This significant professional transformation –
which Leroy described as a general shift from ‘rules to principles’ and from
‘risk avoidance to risk management’ – was grounded in a specific perspective
on the nature and purpose of legal authority and manifested in a new set of
tools, managerial heuristics and bureaucratic techniques for the assessment
and management of ‘risk’.42
36 LVP Annual Report 2013 (n 23) 94.
37 Ibid
38 On the emergence of a ‘governmental technology of risk’ in the public sector more generally. See Julia
Black, ‘The Emergence of Risk-Based Regulation and the New Public Risk Management in the United
Kingdom’ (2005) Public Law 512; Jonathan Pugh, ‘Resilience, Complexity and Post-Liberalism’ (2014)
43(3) Area 313.
39 Jim Yong Kim’s ‘Change Agenda’ called for a ‘major shift in paradigm… from a rules-based to a prin-
ciples-based normative approach to operations that encourages informed risk-taking’. LVP Annual
Report 2013 (n 23) 90.
40 Ibid (emphases added).
41 Ibid
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Before elaborating on these specific tools and techniques, it is important
to note that the embrace of risk called for by the World Bank’s president was
manifested far beyond the domain of criminal justice reform and the specific
institutional segment of the legal department. Leroy’s 2013 essay stresses the
nexus between changes in the ‘culture’ of lawyering and the observation that
‘the Bank is undergoing certain fundamental changes in its way of doing
business’.43 Signifying these changes was the creation of a new lending
instrument – Program-for-Results financing (PforR) – that was introduced
by the Bank in January 2012.44 This instrument ties the Bank’s funding to
the ‘achievement of verifiable results and performance actions’ and operates
on the basis of ‘country and program-specific strategic, technical and risk
considerations’.45 The programmatic aspects of this vehicle rely on a diag-
nostic apparatus to quantify, assess and compare ‘the existing economic,
technical and political situation in the member’s territory’ as well as ‘the
strength of [their] existing institutions’.46 On the basis of these evaluations,
a determination is made on the ‘parameters of the program’ and an oper-
ational strategy is developed to ‘strengthen or build’ national institutions
in order to ‘minimize risk’.47 Additionally, in response to recommendations
by the Bank’s Internal Audit Department (IAD) and Independent Evaluation
Group (IEG),48 the organisation’s senior management developed a range of
reforms proposals regarding the Bank’s main lending instrument – Invest-
ment Project financing – which culminated, following Board approval, in a
new integrated operational policy (OP 10.00).49 At the heart of this ‘modern-
ization’ was the endorsement of a ‘risk-based approach for investment
lending’ and a shift from a ‘rule-based’ operational process to a culture of
‘informed risk-taking’.50 Not only did the Bank need to measure and
42 Particularly telling was Leroy’s managerial manifesto on the proper role of the lawyer in the ‘solutions
Bank’.
43 LVP Annual Report 2013 (n 23).
44 This involved the adoption of Operational Policy and Band Procedure (OP/BP) 9.00. Previously, the
Bank had two key lending instruments: Investment Project Financing (regulated in OP/BP 10.00)
and Development Policy Financing, which has replaced and reproduced the structural adjustment
lending (SAL) (regulated in OP/BP 8.60).
45 See OP 9.00 (n 44) para 5.
46 LVP Annual Report 2013 (n 23) 91. This diagnostic is embedded in the Bank’s ‘systematic country diag-
nostics’ (SCD) that underpin its comprehensive ‘country partnership frameworks’ (CPF). For a more
elaborate definition of this new lending instrument: ‘PforR relies on Bank assessments of programme
systems and institutions, promotes an integrated approach to risk, and encourages management rather
than avoidance of risk, by identifying risks, and balancing them against results. PforR relies on the bor-
rowers’ fiduciary, environmental and social systems, and seeks to address gaps in such systems through
a combination of initiatives, from legal requirements and actions, to capacity building, disbursement
incentives and to implementation support’. In ibid 13 (emphasis added).
47 In OP 9.00 (n 44) para 5–8. On the rationality of reform in the PforR framework. See Maninder Malli,
‘Assessing Capacity Development in World Bank “Program-for-Results Financing”’ (2014) 47(2) Verfas-
sung und Recht in Übersee 250.
48 See, inter alia, Internal Audit Department (IAD), Audit of the World Bank Group Framework for Policies
and Procedures, AC2012-0011 (February 2012) (copy on file).
49 See World Bank, Investment Lending Reform: Concept Note (2009) (copy on file); OP/BP 10.00 (n 44).
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manage ‘risk’ with more conviction and awareness, the organisation also
needed to ‘help [its] client countries to strengthen their own risk manage-
ment systems’.51
The shift from a ‘rules-based’ paradigm (where concerns regarding
mandate, political interference or legal competence pivot centrally) to the
‘principles-based’ operational template of analytical country diagnostics
and risk-management techniques, aligns with the emergence of a ‘risk com-
monwealth’52 in public governance more broadly. For Leroy, who had built
out a career in public sector reform this register came naturally: risk manage-
ment, not international law, had been her bread and butter.53 This manage-
rial reform did not only have an impact on the design of the Bank’s lending
instruments and procedures (as explored above), but also impacted both the
processes of enacting and legitimising the organisation’s internal account-
ability standards that were altered (or dissolved). As an example of the
latter aspect, Leroy’s essay refers to the organisation’s new ‘Environmental
and Social Framework’.54 ‘A key feature of the new framework’, she observes,
‘will be a risk assessment approach… a measured shift towards the mitiga-
tion and management of risks’.55 Indeed, the key change in the environ-
mental and social safeguards lies not in the minor substantive extensions
to previously disregarded policy domains or in the ambiguous references
to international (human rights) law but in the shift from ex ante deontic
standards to a process of downstream contextual assessment and continuous
managerial modification. The prescriptive ex ante evaluation of projects
based on formal normative criteria is thereby traded for a process of ‘adap-
tive [risk] management’ based on ‘downstream monitoring and implemen-
tation support’.56 Reflecting on these changes in the Bank’s lending
instruments and in the changing contours of its accountability standards,
Leroy concluded that ‘[t]he leitmotiv of all these initiatives undergirding
the construction of a ‘Solutions Bank’ is clear’:57 the Bank, she asserted,
had taken a decisive turn toward ‘more agile [and] less regulated decision-
50 See OPCS, Investment Lending Reform: Modernizing and Consolidating Operational Policies and Pro-
cedures, (World Bank 2012) (copy on file) (clarifying that ‘[m]anagement outlined an investment
lending reform programme that was based on… implementing a risk-based approach for investment
lending’).
51 LVP Annual Report 2013 (n 23) 91.
52 Elizabeth Fisher, ‘The Rise of the Risk Commonwealth and the Challenge for Administrative Law’
(2003) 3 Public Law 455.
53 This was, of course, not only the professional trajectory of Leroy but also of the people she gathered
around her. Anna Chytla—who was Deputy General Counsel under Leroy—left the Bank’s Legal Vice
Presidency shortly after Leroy did in 2016 to join LF McCarthy Associates, ‘an international integrity
and risk management services company’. Her webpage highlights extensive experience in ‘managing
risk’ and enhancing ‘agility’, as obtained and developed in the legal department of the Bank. https://
www.lfmccarthyassoc.com/copy-of-scott-b-white (accessed 9 September 2020).
54 World Bank, Environmental and Social Framework (2016) (referred to as ‘ESF’).
55 LVP Annual Report 2013 (n 23) 92.
56 ESF, ESS1 (n 54) para 39, 44.
57 LVP Annual Report 2013 (n 23) 92
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making based on informed risk-taking’.58 These broad-sweeping managerial
changes clearly called for a particular mode of lawyering associated with a
new institutional toolkit of risk management.
‘Taking on the technicalities’59 – the institutional toolkit of un-
governance
In a section of the legal opinion titled Managing Risks of Political Interfer-
ence, Leroy introduces new risk templates and typologies,60 tools of prob-
ability calculus and cost–benefit analysis, and a ‘special review’ mechanism
aimed at iterative risk ‘monitoring’.61 The prohibitive posture of lawyering
is to be traded, the opinion elaborates, for a ‘series of measures aimed at ana-
lysing the risks [of political interference] and managing them’.62 This new
‘analytical framework’ – as Leroy describes it – discards the ‘binary logic’
of the ‘traditional’ legal posture (never constituting a formal act of judg-
ment), and operates on the basis of a ‘spectrum’ of ‘risk categories’,63 each
associated with ‘mitigation measures as well as capacity-building activities
to address those risks’.64 The reference to such ‘capacity-building activities’
in this central ‘tool’ of the new ‘risk-based approach’ signals how the
embrace of this new logic not only impacts the institution’s internal
decision-making processes (including processes of legal interpretation
and legal evaluation) but also its envisaged mode of institutional reform,
which now increasingly focuses on enhancing the local capacities for risk
resilience. Both the identification and qualification of ‘risks’ and the enact-
ment of productive coping strategies and capacity building projects forms
part of a flexible and adaptive learning process that we identify with the
wellness guru.
Since many lawyers in the World Bank were unfamiliar with this method-
ology (or considered it to be ‘unlawyerly’),65 Leroy distributed a Staff
Guidance Note. Its purpose was announced as follows:
[t]his note does not set out a prescriptive set of instructions but provides
guidance for Bank staff on how to analyse whether an [involvement in the
criminal justice sector] is appropriate for the Bank to engage in, how to
58 Ibid
59 Cf Annelise Riles, ‘A New Agenda for the Cultural Study of Law: Taking on the Technicalities’ (2005) 53
(3) Buffalo Law Review 973.
60 Leroy Criminal Justice Opinion (n 32) para 34.
61 Ibid, paras 31–34
62 Ibid, para 27
63 Ibid, para 34. The opinion differentiates between ‘red’, ‘green’ and ‘grey areas’. Different colours are
linked with different management techniques to be employed and adapted iteratively.
64 Ibid, para 1
65 Interview with Senior Legal Official, World Bank Legal Vice Presidency, (Washington DC September
2016).
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assess the risks involved, and how to develop a risk-taking and management
strategy.66
The note clarifies that ‘risks and related management approaches will vary
from country to country and project to project’ and be part of an ‘iterative
process’ of learning and adaptation.67 Three broad stages and associated insti-
tutional procedures are identified: (i) assessment and categorisation; (ii) man-
agement and mitigation; and (iii) monitoring and special review.68 In
developing the different stages of the new ‘analytical framework’, the StaffGui-
dance Note links the required change in legal practice with pre-existing oper-
ational templates: ‘the risk management framework’, Leroy’s opinion clarifies,
‘builds on the Bank’s Operational and Risk Assessment Framework (ORAF)
and other risk assessment and management approaches and tools applied in
Bank operations’.69 As a managerial ‘tool’ for the risk-based approach, the
ORAF is employed to help lawyers to ‘rate risks’ along a ‘linear rating scale’
and develop the appropriate ‘management and mitigation’ techniques.70 It
provides an ‘integrated and nested risk framework that pulls together key
risk areas that may affect the achievement… of an IL [Investment Lending]
operation’.71 The objective of this ‘tool’, it is noted, is to ‘help managers’ to
‘look systematically, holistically, in an integrated manner and in real time, at
risks to achieving project development objectives (PDOs)’.72 In a methodology
that was replicated in the Staff Guidance Note, ORAF provides a ‘framework’
to ‘(i) identify and describe relevant risks… (ii) rate those risks [and] (iii)
establish adequate risk management measures’.73
The stated purpose of ORAF explicitly disavows normativity: it is ‘there to
help’ teams in calculating and containing contingencies that can hamper the
achievement of their PDOs.74 The ruling rationality of the risk-based
66 Legal Vice Presidency, Staff Guidance Note: World Bank Support for Criminal Justice Activities (Febru-
ary 2012) (copy on file with author) (referred to below as ‘Staff Guidance Note’) i.
67 Ibid
68 Ibid, ii-iii
69 Leroy Criminal Justice Opinion (n 32) para 4.
70 Ibid, para 34; Cf OPCS, Guidance Note on the Operational Risk Assessment Framework (ORAF) (World
Bank 2011) (referred to below as ‘ORAF’) paras 2, 4.
71 ORAF (n 70) para 7.
72 Ibid, para 5. The risk assessment framework consists of ORAF Guiding Questions: ‘a reference document
to facilitate the team’s discussions as they identify and describe risks relevant to their operation and to
ensure a comprehensive risk overview’. It also contains a ‘risk assessment template… available as a
web form at all stages of the project cycle’. See ibid paras 14, 29 (emphases added).
73 Ibid, para 7. The ‘four different levels of risk’ are identified as ‘stakeholder risks’ (where ‘teams need to
be aware and mitigate’); ‘operating environment level risks’ (where teams ‘should be aware… even
though they cannot generally be mitigated’); ‘implementing agency level risk’ including ‘capacity risk’
and ‘governance risk’ (where ‘there is scope to influence the risk level… through mitigation
measures’) and ‘project level risk’ (‘where there is the most scope for mitigating and controlling
risk levels through project design’). In ibid para 8.
74 Ibid, paras 5 (‘using risk assessment… helps teams… identify and address emerging issues, including
unanticipated risks’); 14 (‘[t]he document should be used to stimulate thinking, discussion, or even
provoke deeper analysis of less know risk dimensions… The risk dimensions [and] risk categories
… are there to help’) (both emphases added).
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operational toolkit is entrepreneurial: the guiding concern is the ‘achieve-
ment of the project’s results’, and ‘risk ratings’ are attributed on the basis
of the ‘impact of the risk’ on these results and the ‘probability that the risk
will occur’.75 The routine of risk management thereby provides modes of cal-
culation and adaptation oriented towards value-enhancing, competitive
behaviour – the ‘risk appetite’ demanded by senior management – and the
promotion of economic rationality. Foucault’s epithet, ‘live dangerously’,
applies here as the motto of a managerial toolkit occupied less with ‘threat
and loss’ than with ‘gain and profit’.76 This logic resonates also in Leroy’s
defence of her ‘paradigm shift’: while engagement with the criminal justice
sector ‘pos[es] considerable risks’, she argues, it ‘also promise[s] transforma-
tional rewards’.77 The productive logic embedded in this shift from ‘rules’ to
‘principles’ is further elucidated in Leroy’s introduction of a probability-
based cost–benefit calculus aimed at ‘weighing the residual risks against
anticipated benefits’,78 as well as the integration of the ‘risk of absence’: it
would make ‘strategic sense’, Leroy’s Staff Guidance Note states, if the
World Bank would also weigh the ‘risk of not acting’, the risk of missing
out, against ‘risks [of] political interference’ involved in ‘undertaking
action in the criminal justice system’.79
To facilitate the risk-based approach, which provides the model for
Leroy’s ‘paradigm shift’ in legal practice, ORAF provides a ‘risk assessment
template’;80 an online ‘risk portal’ for virtual adaptation at the project
75 Ibid, paras 3, 16. On the ‘entrepreneurial logic’ of ‘new public risk management (‘NPRM’)’ more gen-
erally. See also Black (n 38) 513 (‘[t]he development of internal risk management systems… is in
essence the transposition of private sector risk management methods… to central government’).
76 Cf Foucault (n 11) 66 (‘[W]e can say that the motto of liberalism is: ‘Live dangerously’. [I]ndividuals are
constantly exposed to danger, or rather, they are conditioned to experience their life, their present,
and their future as containing danger. I think this kind of stimulus of danger will be one of the
major implications of liberalism’). As elaborated in the concluding sections, this urge to ‘live danger-
ously’ is intimately intertwined with Foucault’s account of governmentality and the displacement of
sovereign authority by governmental forms attuned to emergent opportunities and desires. See also
(n 11). Kim’s ‘change agenda’ oriented around the need to increase ‘risk appetite’ gives these obser-
vations a prophetic ring.
77 LVP Annual Report 2013 (n 23) 95. She recurrently refers to the ‘opportunity costs’ implicated in the
‘traditional approach’. This register of transformational rewards shows a remarkable overlap with the
contemporary risk management techniques that resonate across the domains of corporate consul-
tancy and security governance. It echoes, for example, in the declaration by Anderson Consulting
(now Accenture) that ‘in today’s economy you have to embrace risk in order to thrive’ and that
‘there is no reward without risk’. ‘Safe’ strategies of oriented at avoiding risk therefore needed to be
traded for strategies capable of capitalising on uncertainty—much in the same way as the promise
of ‘transformational rewards’made by Leroy. This productive attunement to risk in the ‘new normative
framework’ of the World Bank testifies to the observation by Amoore that ‘the business…models for
embracing risk and thriving on uncertainty [have] become a resource to a sovereignty that similarly
seeks securability in place of security’. See Anderson Consulting, Embrace Risk: Managing Risk to Create
Value (2002), cited in Amoore (n 10) 73.
78 Ibid, 98
79 Staff Guidance Note (n 66) para 19.
80 This template provides empty text fields where specific project risks need to be indicated, rated and
ranked, alongside risk management initiatives that specify the responsible actors and results. See
ORAF (n 70), attachment.
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level; visual heuristics for management training (cf Figure 1); ‘rule[s] of
thumb’ for risk management measures;81 a ‘roadmap’ for risk evaluation;82
‘guiding questions’ for risk assessment;83 and detailed allocations of roles
and responsibilities in the ‘dynamic process’ of risk management.84 In inter-
linking legal decision-making with this managerial framework of risk assess-
ment, Leroy’s ‘new normative architecture’ now reconfigures and reduces the
role of the lawyer to her ‘participation… in the [project] team discussions
[on] the PCN [Project Concept Note] risk ratings’.85 This shift in the role
of the lawyer is also explicit in the ‘special review process’ that was intro-
duced by Leroy’s legal opinion and guidance note.86 To ensure that ‘all rel-
evant risks are carefully analysed and appropriate… risk management
measures [are] identified’,87 Leroy noted that the creation of a new ‘mechan-
ism to provide task teams with expert guidance in this new and risky area…
appear[ed] warranted’.88 To this end, the self-proclaimed ‘paradigm shift’ in
legal practice enacted by Leroy was accompanied by the creation of a new
institutional mechanism: the Criminal Justice Resource Group (CJRG).
This CJRG, Leroy set out, would need to be involved in the planning of all
‘high risk’ projects, where it would provide ‘expert analysis of risk and the
identification of potential safeguards and risk management measures’.89
The guidance note (as well as the legal opinion) stipulates that the key nor-
mative concern of the CJRG is not the legality of proposed projects, but the
operational and ‘reputational’ risks for the World Bank.90 The composition
of the CJRG equally signals a relative displacement of legal authority as it is
expanded to include experts from across the Bank in areas such as justice
reform, crime and violence prevention, environmental crimes, risk manage-
ment, urban planning, youth development, gender, stolen asset recovery,
anti-money laundering, and assistance to fragile and conflict-affected states,
81 ORAF (n 70) para 21.
82 Ibid, para 29
83 Ibid, para 14
84 Ibid, para 39. The project team emerges as entity responsible for the articulation and constant assess-
ment of operational risks (aided by country, sector and financial management).
85 Ibid, para 39
86 Staff Guidance Note (n 66) para 43.
87 Ibid
88 Ibid. The CJRG is given a wide mandate: ‘participation in the CAS/CPS [Country Assistance Strategy/
Country Partnership Strategy] process’; ‘participation in the development of PCNs [Project Concept
Notes] and Projects Appraisal Documents (PADs)’; ‘Technical Assistance (TA)’; and ‘documenting
and evaluating progress [by] develop[ing] a data base of lessons learned that will inform program-
ming in the criminal justice sector over time’. Ibid, para 45
89 Ibid, para 46 (‘[I]n the exceptional cases wherein the Bank decides to undertake activities that are high
risk, teams must seek the advice of the CJRG to review the proposed activities in order to provide
teams and Bank decision makers with expert analysis of risks and the identification of potential safe-
guards and risk management measures. [T]his review [should] take place prior to the finalization of
the PCN [Project Concept Note], so that guidance from the CJRG can be taken into account by the
team to develop risk management measures early on in project preparation’).
90 Ibid, para 43
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as well as the relevant Regional staff and OPCS [Operations Policy and
Country Services].91
The emergence of risk-management as a productive encounter with
uncertainty is less the product of consciously planned attempts to overcome
or accommodate the impossibility of closure, than it is an effort to capitalise
on it by means of institutional arrangements of unsettlement and reconfi-
guration determined by adaptive managerial diagnostics and institutional
templates. ORAF explains that
[r]isk assessment is a dynamic process starting with preparation and continu-
ing through implementation. This assessment will help to continuously
monitor the evolution of risks; to identify the emergence of new risks; to
assess progress with, and impact of the implementation of risk management
measures; and, as necessary, to devise appropriate adjustments to support to
achievement of the project’s results.92
The ‘live document’ of ORAF, which serves as a key instrument of this unset-
tlement and production, is intertwined with myriad techniques for sensing
or gauging material conditions on the ground. In its (wellness guru) mode
of channelling the impossibility of closure,93 Leroy’s ‘new normative archi-
tecture’ of risk-management thereby works in conjunction with an extensive
informational infrastructure.94 As the Staff Guidance Note indicates, the
registration, management and mitigation of risk – or, in positive terms, its
production and circulation – demands an ‘in-depth understanding of the
agencies and other stakeholders involved and targeted’.95 Risk is constituted
through an extensive set of ‘diagnostic tools’ and ‘analytic and advisory
activities (AAA)’ that provide a ‘holistic analysis of the country’s institutions
and legal system’.96 It is in this context that we have to situate the calls for a
technical alignment of ‘standard operating procedures’ in security systems
and the adoption of ‘shared data standards’ for the ‘effective performance
measurement and monitoring of [security] sector agencies’.97 In its reliance
on, and its emergence from, constant informational flows – data that is ren-
dered actionable through its enrolment in premade templates – the govern-
mental technology of risk demands specific practices of observation that are
91 Ibid, para 44
92 Ibid, para 3
93 Desai and Lang (n 1).
94 This demands attention to the material assemblages and alignments shaping institutional practices.
See ibid.
95 Staff Guidance Note (n 66) para 23, section 4.
96 Ibid, para 22. These analyses stand in dialogue with the World Bank’s Systemic Country Diagnostics
(SCDs). On the performativity of SCDs as governmental tools, see Dimitri Van Den Meerssche, ‘Inter-
national Organizations and the Performativity of Measuring States’ (2018) 15(1) International Organ-
izations Law Review 168.
97 Ibid, para 23, section 10
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increasingly facilitated by practices of data analytics.98 This does not imply
that the technology of risk management labours towards the closing of
knowledge gaps – rather, it signals the grounding of these organisational rou-
tines in computational practices that produce ever more objects of knowl-
edge and subjects of reform.
‘The role of the lawyer in the solutions bank’99 – risk as
productive professional practice
The qualification of this institutional technique as a provisional, material
assemblage enacted through mundane professional practices helps to
appreciate the performative and productive nature of the risk-based govern-
ance tools. The ‘risk scores’ that serve as focal points in Leroy’s ‘new norma-
tive architecture’ do not (purport to) serve as unmediated representation of
external phenomena to be acted upon, but serve as thoroughly artificial heur-
istics allowing the organisation to move beyond the impossibility of closure
in a productive manner. It is through these iterative and adaptive practices of
assessment, mitigation and management itself that risk artefacts gradually
coagulate and form effects in stable networks of institutional practice.100
‘Risk’, Dillon generally observes, ‘is a carefully crafted artefact [and] does
not exist “out there”, independent… of the computational and discursive
practices that constitute specific risks as the risks that they are… Risks are
thus created, circulated, proliferated and capitalized upon’.101 The direct
relationship between ‘risk assessment’ and ‘capacity-building activities’ in
the ORAF further signals how the embrace of this new technology not
only impacts the ‘paradigm’, ‘analytical framework’ or ‘normative architec-
ture’ of legal evaluation in the World Bank, but also its envisaged mode of
governance reform (focused now on enhancing immanent capacities of
risk resilience).102 For projects in contentious operational domains (such
as the security sector), the ORAF provides novel bureaucratic tools for
designing ‘capacity-building activities’ in the client state; evaluating
‘whether or not to go forward’ with the operation and ‘deciding on the pro-
cessing speed’ of the project in the World Bank’s transactional machinery.
98 One of the first projects employing Leroy’s ‘new normative architecture’ indeed focuses on building
and maintaining an infrastructure for ‘high-quality’ ‘geo-referenced crime and violence data’ by
financing national and municipal ‘violence observatories’. See World Bank (IDA), Honduras – Safer
Municipalities Project, Project Appraisal Document (15 November 2012) (referred to below as ‘Hon-
duras Safer Municipalities Project) 3.
99 See LVP Annual Report 2013 (n 23).
100 Cf Foucault (n 12) 248; Gavin Sullivan, ‘Taking on the Technicalities of International Law—Practice,
Description, Critique: A Response to Fleur Johns’ (2017) 111 AJIL Unbound 181.
101 Michael Dillon, ‘Underwriting Security’ (2008) 39 Security Dialogue 322.
102 Cf David Chandler, ‘Rethinking the Conflict-Poverty Nexus: from Securitizing Intervention to Resili-
ence’ (2015) 4(1) Stability: International Journal of Security and Development 2. In the next section
we focus in more detail on the rise of ‘resilience’-based thinking in the World Bank’s reformist
practices.
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‘Some measures’, the ORAF indicates, ‘may go beyond mitigation to also
include capacity building and system enhancements to reduce the risks not
only for the duration of the operation but also to prepare the borrower for
better dealing with such risks following the conclusion of the operation’.103
Yet, the ORAF explicitly denies that its risk-based diagnosis and ‘capacity-
building’ would thereby constitute an evaluative, political enterprise:
‘[c]lients… should understand that the Bank uses risk ratings to make
decisions as to best support [them] and is not making value judgments or
ranking countries’.104 The governmental logic of risk unfolds in an agnostic
register, outside normative premises of liberal interventionism.105
To conclude, by framing the institution’s contentious operational expan-
sion into the field of security sector reform as a matter of ‘manageable risk’,
Leroy’s Legal Memorandum and Staff Guidance Note envisaged a ‘paradigm
shift’ in legal practice where ‘boundaries’ are traded for ‘risk categories’ and
‘prohibitions’ for ‘management strategies’.106 This, she understood, called for
both the introduction of novel evaluative tools (such as the ‘live instrument’
of the ORAF)107 and the cultivation of an altered professional sensibility
oriented towards an adaptive attunement to insecurity and complexity.
This calculative, risk-oriented logic, Leroy claimed, ‘lays the groundwork’
for a radically new ‘paradigm for the future role of Bank lawyers in
dealing with Articles’ interpretation’.108 This was her response to the per-
ceived need to ‘rethink the traditional role played by lawyers in the Bank’
and the expressed conviction that ‘the legal [department] continues to play
a central role’.109 The institutional ‘shift from risk avoidance to risk manage-
ment, and from bright rules to broad principles’, Leroy held, ‘need not spell
the end of the lawyers’ role in… interpretation or in any other aspect of the
Bank’s work’.110
The assemblage of risk management tools and templates developed else-
where in the World Bank’s operational segments was now put forward as the
more opportune and robust mode of legal practice and, thereby, displaced
the ‘old’ language, argumentative practice and professional sensibility of
international law(yering) as it had previously been embodied within the
organisation. In its practical manifestation, this ‘new normative architecture’
of risk management signals both the displacement of the oedipal figure by the
wellness guru and the concomitant emergence of a type of institutional
practice displaying a ‘simultaneous commitment to closure and its
103 Staff Guidance Note (n 66) para 20 (emphasis added).
104 Ibid, para 40
105 Cf Chandler (n 103).
106 Cf LVP Annual Report 2013 (n 23).
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impossibility’.111 Leroy’s ‘paradigm shift’ was oriented at orchestrating
action despite uncertainty regarding foundational questions on the limits
of institutional authority and the nature of political interference. These
formal concerns, which had been central to the authority associated with
the oedipal figure, were displaced by holding devices and management
tools aimed at coping with (and capitalising on) this open-endedness and
contingency. The move from the oedipal figure to the wellness guru
thereby reflects a move towards an adaptive, calculative and utilitarian
logic grounded in particular material technologies of seeing, reasoning and
acting and attuned to the central tenets of the move to un-governance.112
Our analysis above has explored this ‘embrace of risk’ as both a set of
novel evaluative tools and heuristics as well as the cultivation of a particular
(flexible, adaptive) professional sensibility attuned to uncertainty. This turn
was rendered visible not only in formal legal decisions but also in operational
toolkits, managerial manifestos, visual heuristics, task team compositions
and risk management templates.
Un-governing through contingency and self-denial – the
rationality of resilience
The foregoing changes in its ‘normative architecture’ enabled the World
Bank’s engagement with the security sector of states and with matters of vio-
lence and conflict. In this field, new operational models and toolkits were
deployed for coping with violence and rationalising socio-political adap-
tation, in sharp differentiation from the World Bank’s earlier practices of
institutional reform. Aligning with the articulated features of un-governance,
these new models propose to operate through rather than against unknow-
ability, agnosticism and contingency with adaptive, mutable, open-ended
and data-driven attempts at enhancing the resilience of local communities.
These transformations entail altered modes of knowing and seeing;113 a
more radical decentring of sovereign sites of authority as essential vectors
of reform; and practices of both detection and intervention aimed at captur-
ing and capitalising the immanent and emergent surplus of life formerly situ-
ated outside the architectonics of institutional reform. Throughout the
World Bank, however, these models were less the result of conscious
design and more the result of improvisational, experimental techniques
and toolkits – dispersing authority across the staff, rather than consolidating
it around a central figure or plan.
The World Bank’s 2011 World Development Report (WDR) on Conflict,
Security and Development is exemplary here. While previous versions of the
111 Desai and Lang (n 1).
112 Ibid
113 Cf Johns (n 15).
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institution’s flagship publication consistently provide models for an ideal
institutional configuration for development (leaving space, of course, for
modification of institutional transplants to specific local contexts),114 the
2011 WDR is surprisingly agnostic when it comes to matters of policy gui-
dance. It underlines on multiple occasions that ‘there is no “one path”’ to
prosperity and security in the development process.115 ‘Institutions do not
need to converge on Western models’, the report stipulates, ‘local adaptation
is best’.116 Rather than putting forward ideal types or best practices, the
mantra of the adopted paradigm is that violence is ‘complex, diverse and
diffuse’ and needs to be counteracted by continuous adaptation and homeo-
pathic forms of policy intervention on the level of ‘local institutions’.117 Vio-
lence and poverty are qualified as immanent ‘risks’ for every society that need
to be coped with by ‘resilient’ institutions.118 The model, thereby, trades fam-
iliar ‘cause-and-effect’ interventions, grounded in moral or epistemic univer-
sals, for iterative, process-based, open-ended and never-ending cycles of
policy intervention that work with (rather than against) complexity in an
attempt to improve a society’s own capacity to manage risk and stress
resiliently.119
This resilience-based logic clearly differs from recognisable rationalist
attempts to bridge knowledge gaps between global projects and local sites
114 The 2002 WDR, for example, claims that ‘existing and newly transplanted institutions can be more
effective in poor countries if they are systematically modified to take these differences into
account’. Yet, while leaving spaces for this attunement to the ‘local’ level, the report explicitly pro-
claims that it ‘presents a framework for institutional change’ and ‘illustrates how to proceed in build-
ing more effective institutions’. This WDR thereby serves as a prototype example of modernist
‘institution building’, where ‘local’ knowledge is to be factored in the construction of ‘effective
market-supporting institutions’. The possibility of such epistemic closure – the overcoming of knowl-
edge gaps – is essential to this rationalist model of institutional change. See World Bank, Building
Institutions for Markets (World Bank 2002) 4, 9, 11.
115 World Bank, Conflict, Security and Development (World Bank 2011) (referred to below as ‘World Bank
WDR 2011’).
116 Ibid
117 See Michael J Watts, ‘Economies of Violence: Reflections on the World Development Report 2011’
(2012) Humanity 118–119. The WDR, Watts observes, thereby departs from universalist, mechanistic
and reductions policy interventions that aimed to transplant context-free and timeless institutional
templates (such as the rule of law, democracy or markets).
118 World Bank WDR 2011 (n 116) 45. (Setting out the general framework for ‘[b]uilding resilience to vio-
lence’). ‘In this framing’, Chandler more generally observes, ‘poverty and related problems become
normalized, leading to coping strategies rather than crisis-driven discourses of policy intervention’.
See Chandler (n 103) 5.
119 World Bank WDR 2011 (n 116) 107 (‘Just as violence repeats, efforts to build confidence and trans-
form institutions typically follow a repeated spiral’). Ibid, 112 (‘[L]eaders, stakeholders, and the inter-
national community must remember that societies will go through multiple cycles of confidence-
building and institutional reform before they can achieve the resilience to violence necessary for
development as usual’. The Foucauldian dimension of these iterative interventionist dynamics are
apparent. These empirical observations can further be brought in dialogue with wider epistemologi-
cal transformations. See, for example, Latour (n 11); John Law, After Method: Mess in Social Science
(Routledge 2004). In the World Bank, a heuristic that has emerged to capture this governance
type is ‘Problem Driven Iterative Adaptation’ (PDIA)’. See Matt Andrews, Lant Pritchett and
Michael Woolcock, ‘Escaping Capability Traps Through Problem Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA)’
(2013) 51(11) World Development 234.
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of reform: in the turn to immanence, the vector of social change is now
inversed. The surplus of life – the externalities and complexities that defy leg-
ibility in rationalist registers of reform – are no longer impediments to be
overcome but immanent energies to be enrolled and capitalised on.120
This transformation is apparent in the visual representation of the resilience
framework in theWDR, as referred to above and reproduced at Figure 2. The
shift from intervention at the level of causation to intervention at the level of
resilience is represented here with remarkable optical and metaphorical pre-
cision. Expressive of the immanent ontology of the resilience paradigm, the
WDR elaborates that the ‘framework is graphically represented as a spiral,
because these processes repeat over time as countries go through successive
transition moments’.121 ‘Even as one set of immediate priorities is resolved’,
the report observes, ‘other risks and transition moments emerge and require
a repeated cycle of action to bolster institutional resilience to stress’.122 At the
heart of this model is the assertion that ‘[b]uilding resilience to violence and
fragility is a nationally owned process’, and that ‘external support and incen-
tives’ can only ‘contribute to progress’ insofar as they engage with, enrol and
stimulate ‘local organic processes’.123 The enhancement of autonomous
capacities of resilience at a local level, in this sense, is operationalised
through unscripted processes of learning and adaptation. The focus on
endless, circular iteration (as reflected in the spiral) as well as the inversion
of the vector of reform (from the local pointing upwards) signal how this
form of un-governance reconfigures the orthodox temporal and spatial coor-
dinates of institution-building.124 The topographies and temporalities of this
reformist project are provisional, open-ended and mediated by mundane
material practices of trial, translation and learning. The local thereby
appears as an always inaccessible yet pivotal normative repository for the
global.125 The endpoint is always only a moment of reorientation (in poten-
tially different directions) en route to ever more of the same. The time and
space of reform are (re)organised in the relational practices of resilience
themselves.
120 This reflects the productive embrace of the ‘impossibility of closure’ referred to above. On how these
new ways of governing and ‘seeing like a state’ impact modes of critique, our analysis aligns with
Johns (n 15). As Chandler notes, the turn to resilience thereby reflect a particular ontological position
that sees the ‘reality of the world in its plurality, flux and difference’. See Chandler (n 13) 51.
121 World Bank WDR 2011 (n 116) 46.
122 Ibid (emphases added)
123 Ibid, 106
124 Cf Desai and Lang (n 1) 6. (‘It flows from the nature of the visions to be implemented that these [GU]
practices do not have a stable topography nor temporality of institutional change’).
125 Cf Cedric De Coning, ‘From Peacebuilding to Sustaining Peace: Implications of Complexity for Resi-
lience and Sustainability’ (2016) 4(3) Resilience: International Policies, Practices and Discourses 166.
(‘The agency of the local in the context of a shift in the debate away from liberal top-down
problem-solving approaches towards more pluralistic bottom-up approaches that do not have the
ambition to resolve conflict, but instead invest in the resilience of local social institutions to
prevent, cope with, and recover from conflict’ at 178).
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‘The political economy of reform and risk’126
The governance strategy associated with WDR 2011 states that the World Bank
no longer promotes ‘presumed solutions based on institutional and organiz-
ational forms [enacted] elsewhere’.127 Rather, informed by the ‘political
economy of reform and risk’, the strategy claims to provide a new ‘problem-
solving approach’ that relies on continuous, open-ended cycles of diagnosis
and tailored intervention, without ‘assumptions about the ideal form a judicial
system should take’.128 In this strategy, ‘the use and strengthening of developing
countries’ systems is central’.129 The legal department’s companion piece is even
more explicit in its agnosticism and its rejection of universalist policy models: ‘it
should be clear that the Bank does not have a blueprint for success in justice
reform’, the piece states, which calls for a ‘problem-solving and empirically
based approach… rather than the establishment of what are identified in
advance as the “right” institutions and rules’.130 New policy ‘models and
approaches’ are called for in this open-ended process of problem-solving, such
as the identification of ‘flagship justice reform initiatives as sites of learning
and innovation’.131 Rather than seeking to overcome the knowledge gaps associ-
ated with social complexity by developing updated policy templates, these tools
embrace the radical contingency of society and seek to govern through and with
contingency via open-ended and adaptable practices of ‘problem-solving’ that
aim at fostering risk resilience at the level of the population. The ‘political
economy of reform and risk’, in short, does not provide ‘pre-set goals’ but
entails ‘the careful management or modulation of interactions to attempt to
balance and ease the strains of adaptation as an ongoing process’.132 It thereby
forms a pivotal element in the turn to ‘un-governance’ within the World Bank.
This shift from the old cause-and-effect ideals of liberal interventionism to
practices of (not) knowing and acting associated with resilience was closely
linked with new technological assemblages at and including the World
Bank.133 The implementation, adaptation and appraisal of projects designed
to amplify resilience at the (always contingent and unknown) ‘local’ level,
126 World Bank, Strengthening Governance, Tackling Corruption: The World Bank Group’s Updated Strategy
and Implementation Plan (World Bank 2012) (referred to below as ‘World Bank 2012’) 32.
127 Ibid
128 Ibid, 35–36 (emphasis added)
129 Ibid, 36
130 World Bank Legal Vice Presidency, New Directions in Justice Reform – A Companion Piece to the
Updated Strategy and Implementation Plan on Strengthening Governance, Tackling Corruption
(World Bank 2012) (referred to below as ‘World Bank Legal Vice Presidency 2012’) 7–8.
131 Ibid, 7, 11
132 This aligns with the observations of Chandler on the turn to resilience – described as an adaptive
mode of ‘mapping’ – more generally. See Chandler (n 13) 51.
133 On the toolkits associated with ‘ignorance work’, see Deval Desai and Michael Woolcock, ‘Experimen-
tal Justice Reform: Lessons from the World Bank and Beyond’ (2015) 11 Annual Review of Law and
Social Science 155; Deval Desai, ‘Ignorance/Power: Rule of Law Reform and the Administrative Law
of Global Governance’ in Moshe Hirsch and Andrew Lang (eds), Research Handbook on the Sociology
of International Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2018).
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relies on the continuous influx of digital data and diagnostics. Capacity-build-
ing and resilience interventions, the governance strategy noted, required new
‘diagnostic tools’ to ‘improve the assessment of country systems’ as elements of
a ‘national capacity building strategy’.134 The legal vice presidency’s companion
piece equally urges that ‘[s]trongdiagnostics should inform thedesignof interven-
tions by providing data on the actual functions of the justice system, the political
economy of reform and its risks, and the way potential reforms might translate
intoprogress towards justice’.135Bothoperational documents, therefore, articulate
calls to expand the World Bank’s data-gathering infrastructure and diagnostic
capacities.136 Importantly, this new infrastructure for data analytics was not
only needed within the World Bank but also within these ‘local’ sites themselves.
Consequently, the reform ‘process’, the companion piece states, supports the
‘national capacity for data collection’ considered necessary for ‘cross-country
learning and collaboration’.137 If ‘local’ actors or spaces of governance are to be
made resilient through iterative and open-ended process of reform, they would
need to be seen, measured and mapped. This enormous flow of data is not (or
at least not exclusively) processed through pre-existing schemes of interpretation
andpolicy action, however, but also produces new formsof policy design, learning
and implementation.138 The very point of these interventions often emerges only
in dialoguewith data analytics (a point no longer expressed in terms of ‘right insti-
tutions’ but emanating from the ‘needs of end users’).139 Continuous contextual
data, in other words, is what materially ties the governmental assemblage of
action-despite-agnosticism in the sphere of justice reform together.140 It is the
energy of an unscripted, immanent mode of intervention.141
134 World Bank 2012 (n 128) 37.
135 World Bank Legal Vice Presidency 2012 (n 132) 8.
136 World Bank 2012 (n 128) 18. (‘[Justice sector reform] requires rigorous and in-depth diagnostics’); 71
(‘micro-level quantitative and qualitative diagnostic work is sure to reveal a variety of specific gov-
ernance… problems’). World Bank Legal Vice Presidency 2012 (n 132) 8 (‘[d]ata is the foundation of
… justice reform’); 10 (emphasising the growing ‘need for rapid diagnostic tools that allow potential
reformers to embrace opportunities for reform’). This embrace of data analytics as a way of ‘living
with emergent uncertainty’, Amoore notes, resonates with private sector tools of risk management
where the emphasis lies on ‘information sharing [and] data integration’. Amoore refers in this case to
the corporate consultancy of McKinsey. See Amoore (n 10) 12.
137 World Bank Legal Vice Presidency 2012 (n 132) 10.
138 Ibid, 8. On this difference, contrast James C Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve
the Human Condition Have Failed (Yale University Press 1998) with Johns (n 15) 849–850 (‘[T]he state
no longer aspires to make its own maps, or direct its own monocular gaze from on high’).
139 World Bank Legal Vice Presidency 2012 (n 132) 8. This digital registration and enrolment of the ‘needs
of end users’ in unscripted governance interventions resonates with the practice of Pulse Lab Jakarta
mapped in Johns (n 15).
140 With ‘data’, of course, we do not mean the raw, measured material, but the infrastructure of gather-
ing data, and making it actionable through institutionally stable expert practices. This mode of ‘un-
governance’, in the words of Johns, ‘envisions possibilities being worked up iteratively and induc-
tively from the inferences that may be drawn from the data available, as limited as those data
may be’. See Johns (n 15) 853. See also Lang (n 22).
141 Cf Duffield (n 16) 15 (‘Connectivity has allowed resilience to come of age as an operational tool, the
roll-out of an embedded digital infrastructure transforms the desired qualities of resilience into a
cybernetic command and control function’). See also Chandler (n 13).
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One World Bank project – the Honduras Safer Municipalities Project –
reveals the contours of this risk-resilience assemblage and the way in which
its various technical, material and conceptual components are brought
together in a particularly powerful way. In line with the expression of un-gov-
ernance mapped out above, the project’s stated objective is to enhance the
‘resilience of communities to address key risk factors of violence’.142 The
attempt to enhance capacities of resilience at the local level is embedded in
an ‘integrated approach to violence prevention’, which addresses all ‘risk
factors that increase the likelihood of a person to become either a victim or
perpetrator of violence’ through ‘multiple, coordinated interventions and
activities, whether at the individual, family, peer, community or societal
level’.143 In a remarkable expression of the resilience paradigm, the project
states that it will therefore ‘use the ecological risk model developed by the
WHO to identify and target key risk factors related to violence’.144 It is the
language of immunology and adaptation – not intervention and transplan-
tation – that structures this ideal of governance reform. To orchestrate these
localised, iterative and wide-ranging reform projects – generating resilience
through ‘the family, the school and the community’ – the project primarily
aims at building a complex data infrastructure: the ‘provision of technical
assistance and acquisition of equipment to enhance the National Violence
Observatory’ and the ‘strengthening of municipal crime and violence observa-
tories’ are central to the spiral-like learning process of resilience, which relies
on a continuous flow of ‘localised’ knowledge and data.145
With the turn to resilience, the state as a privileged international legal
subject and an insulated sphere of authority is decentred, and the focus
shifts to materially observable and legible aspects of life trained for resilience
(the ‘family, school and community’). The episteme of this governmental
logic is not the mechanical Enlightenment ideal of causality that under-
pinned the grand narratives of liberal internationalism. The change is predi-
cated instead on a biophysical vocabulary of autoimmunisation and
adaptation emerging from various management, organisational, and social
science disciplines – touching on fields like systems theory, cybernetics
and ecological sustainability. It no longer commits to policy transplants or
scripted techniques for problem-solving, but provides coping strategies for
self-empowerment, resilience and risk-management in emergent, complex
and contingent processes in which violence and deprivation are engendered.
More abstractly, this epistemological rupture can be qualified as a departure




145 Ibid, 3, 6–7 (The ‘local government’s capacity’ to handle ‘risk’ is enhanced through the proliferation of
‘high-quality and geo-referenced data’).
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from orthodox architectonics of sovereign reform towards Foucauldian
notions of governmentality. In the latter sense, these transformations can
then also be situated in the longer genealogy of attempts to register and
enrol the surplus of life, the externalities of modernity, that always escape
governance. In this sense, we argue, as expression of un-governance, resili-
ence signals not a suspension but an acceleration of a material mode of gov-
erning under conditions of unending competition for its own sake. As with
other developments in the genealogy, it represents a moment of material, his-
torical transformation, but simultaneously exhibits elements of continuity
with the apparatuses out of which it has developed. Un-governance, as inves-
tigated in this special issue, captures the element of pivotal transformation in
the move to appropriate the surplus of life as a source of power in the
conduct of the population. By the same token, however, the ever-more-gran-
ular dispersion of adaptive techniques tailored to the productivity of the
population represents continuity, especially insofar as it reflects an extension
of economic rationality predicated on myriad individualised material situ-
ations. Both these elements, change and continuity, are characteristic of a
temporal social order defined by competition without end, driving a race
for material change in an unending pursuit of ever-greater production.
They are characteristic of a singular regime’s escalating attempts to
capture an uncapturable surplus of life.
Productive practices in a time of endless competition
Behind the adaptive immediacy associated with the institutional changes
described in the preceding sections lie two things that we observe in Fou-
cauldian terms of governmentality: (1) a technology of risk assembled in
practice on the basis of an economic appreciation for contingency and
emergence, such as in Leroy’s ‘new normative framework’; and prior
even to that, (2) a temporal condition (along the lines of a dispositif in
the Foucauldian vocabulary) populated by myriad subjects interacting
transactionally in a state of competition without end or object beyond sus-
taining competitive, transactional relationships. The temporal order associ-
ated with endless competition is bound up with an historical move away
from the universal and teleological orders that preceded the modern politi-
cal economics of the secular interstate system. Competition and economic
self-interest replaced classical empire and imperial ambition.146 We also, by
proposing the metaphors of Oedipus and a wellness guru, incorporated a
Lacanian psychoanalytic vocabulary in our analysis, one applicable to the
146 Foucault (n 12). To be clear: Foucault’s argument is that European powers abandoned imperial ambi-
tions to subsume one another; outside of that limited but crucial context, imperial ambition persisted
in all of its colonial violence as perpetrated by some of the same European powers.
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normative significance of law in this context by virtue of being specifically
trained on a central lack around which identity and action are organised
and regulated.147 This vocabulary helps to analyse the work done by and
with gaps in knowledge systems inside enterprises of international law
and global governance, and the institutional work done despite an impossi-
bility of closure.
In making sense of these practices, we therefore draw on Foucault’s work
to situate un-governance practices in the temporal and historical frame he
established for governmentality, while drawing on the Lacanian vocabulary
as the basis for a (non-historicist) assessment of the development of un-gov-
ernance practices in that frame of governmentality over time. Foucault, in his
overall genealogy of rational governance techniques, observes a move from
disciplinary and state-oriented governance (identified with raison d’etat) to
a different sort of governmentality keyed to population, or the diversity of
individuals constituting all together the object and subject of political
power in modern, secular social relations.148 The change over time is
bound up with the dispositifmentioned above, featuring an embrace of econ-
omic rationality for competitive production, production without greater
object or end other than the sustenance of more production under competi-
tive circumstances.149 This condition might be visualised as a spiral, moving
in circles without end but always escalating towards a particular direction (ie,
heightened competition). Such a figure of the spiral has been used for un-
governance purposes by the World Bank, as reproduced above at Figure 2.
It is also the figure of a peculiar political economy of self-affirming subjects
interacting on a competitive, transactional basis, resulting in ever greater
production but without any other apparently unifying teleology.150
The emphasis on the productivity of the population prompts a move away
from a consolidated centre of disciplinary command associated with the
state, towards dispersed technologies predicated not (or no longer primarily)
on discipline, but on profiting from the competitive potential of a population
in its diversity. That shift over time includes the development of materialised
law intended to maximise the productive capacity of the population, by max-
imising the productive powers of the individuals it comprises in transac-
tional networks. The change marks a move away from imposed rational
plans and towards opportunistic responses to dynamic conditions, much
as the new direction at the World Bank that we describe diminished reliance
on pre-set models in favour of adaptive agency. In the historical context
described by Foucault, disciplinary domination could not over time
147 As elaborated above, our references to Lacan come by way of Žižek (n 7).
148 Foucault (n 12).
149 Ibid
150 Geoff Gordon, ‘The Time of Contingency in International Law’, in Kevin Jon Heller and Ingo Venzke
(eds), Situating Contingency in International Law (Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
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adequately account for the contingent possibilities of dynamic conditions
that are inherent in the population. Under conditions of constantly escalat-
ing competition, the closure sought by discipline alone was too restrictive.151
Governmentality, trained on instrumentalising the diverse competitive
potentialities of a population, surpassed disciplinary domination (though
did not abandon it) with a more process-based, resilience-oriented mode
of governance, less vulnerable to contingencies, one more conducive to thriv-
ing under competitive conditions.
As a result, the locus of authority moves from diminished central points of
consolidated interest and control to still more dispersed technologies oper-
ating according to the contingent situation(s) of the population – a
process associated with a decentring of sites of authority and an appropria-
tion of ever-expanding productive dimensions of social life. As a means of
practical governance, imposed planning becomes apparently less efficacious
than opportunistic responses to dynamics emergent in the population itself.
But even the population-based governmental programme that capitalises on
contingency reaches its productive limit in the phenomenon identified by
Foucault as the surplus of life. The surplus of life, however, is a strange
sort of limit. It is not an object, but a condition of escape that always frus-
trates governing structures of power at their margins.152 And because it
describes a condition of perpetual escape, the surplus of life represents a
limit that is constantly receding. This is the sort of limit that is produced
by the underlying temporal condition (the dispositif) of constantly escalating
competition without end. The surplus of life is the failure to reach a final
point of ultimate productivity, the impossibility of its closure, which
makes the surplus of life also the horizon of possibility for ever more com-
petitive performance.
As described by the editors in their introduction to this special issue,
un-governance introduces a new governmental practice into this situ-
ation, one which in our framework now appears as logical as it does para-
doxical: namely, embracing the impossibility of closure to advance the
impossible pursuit of closure. And here the Lacanian insight is key to
assessing the contemporary situation of institutions pursuing closure by
embracing the impossibility of closure: the embrace of the impossibility
of closure can be analysed according to the very urge towards closure
with which it conflicts.153
151 Foucault (n 11); Foucault (n 12).
152 Foucault (n 12).
153 In terms of the temporal disposition, or dispositif: to maintain competition, participants must be com-
mitted to ‘winning’, but winning cannot be possible if competition is to be maintained; in the mean-
time, the commitment to winning drives the pursuit of ever more surplus production, by which the
competitive vitality of the population is assured.
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Risk in the register of enjoyment
Key to the developments described here has been the adoption and refinement
of risk as a technology of governance. Aswe instantiated with reference to insti-
tutional innovations at theWorldBank, risk constitutes amaterialmodeof gov-
erning that diminishes law’s prohibitive parameters to capitalise oncontingency
and the impossibility of closure. Risk today includes particular technologies that
go beyond risk technologies of just a few years ago. Whereas risk technologies
have traditionally been deployed prophylactically, following insurance models,
today they are deployed opportunistically, as speculation, more in keeping with
practices associated with the world of finance.154 In this specific historical
context, risk technologies produce an equally specific sort of resilience, more
closely linked with thriving than with enduring.155 This combination of specu-
lation and thriving calls for one last Lacanian term, but which is also a quotidian
one, namely enjoyment.156 The specific phenomena of risk and resilience at
work in this story demonstrate the political valence of enjoyment under the his-
torical and material conditions of competition today. The connection between
risk and enjoyment is already apparent in the regular identification of risk tech-
nologies with gambling.157 As read through Žižek, ‘Lacan’s fundamental thesis
is that superego in its most fundamental dimension is an injunction to enjoy-
ment: the various forms of superego commands are nothing but variations of
the same motif: “Enjoy!”’ By this reading, gambling becomes obligatory, even
as it remains distinct from the legal mandate:
Law is the agency of prohibition which regulates the distribution of enjoyment
on the basis of a common, shared renunciation…whereas superego marks a
point at which permitted enjoyment, freedom-to-enjoy, is reversed into obli-
gation to enjoy – which, one must add, is the most effective way to block
access to enjoyment.158
Our investigations here explore in institutional register this fault line
between law and superego, prohibition and prescription, gambling as
154 The derivative, for example, figures as financial format where risk is employed productively and
speculatively – a form of ‘risk management in which the relationship between the instrument and
an assumed underlying value becomes fleeting, uncertain and loose’. The ‘reward characteristics
of the derivative’, in other words, ‘are sustained in a way that is indifferent to the risks of individual
underlying elements’. See Amoore (n 10); see also Dick Bryan and Michael Rafferty, Capitalism with
Derivatives (Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Duncan Wigan, ‘Financialization and Derivatives: Constructing
an Artifice of Indifference’ (2009) 13(2) Competition and Change 157.
155 We have described this in the Foucauldian register of desire. See (n 11) and (n 76). For an explicit
account of such an embrace of risk, see Tom Baker and Jonathan Simon, ‘Embracing Risk’ in Tom
Baker and Jonathan Simon (eds), Embracing Risk: The Changing Culture of Insurance and Responsibility
(University of Chicago Press, 2002).
156 The proper Lacanian term is jouissance. We use the English translation also to signal our simplified
usage, tailored to the institutional context of our investigations. See, Jacques Lacan, ‘The Ethics of
Psychoanalysis’: 1959–1960: The seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book VII (WW Norton and Company, 1992).
157 Cf Lisa Adkins, The Time of Money (Stanford University Press, 2018).
158 Žižek (n 7) 237.
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object of regulation and gambling as a mode or mandate of regulation.159
Žižek encapsulates the difference as follows: ‘[t]he external law regulates
pleasures in order to deliver us from the superegotistical imposition of enjoy-
ment which threatens to overflow our daily life.’160 In our study, the super-
ego has been switched out for the World Bank’s ‘new normative
architecture’, with the daily overflow being a driver behind risk-based gov-
ernance routines that would capitalise on immanent conditions of a
surplus of life.
But gambling has been the frustrating pursuit of enjoyment throughout a
variety of historical and material conditions. The question becomes: why
does gambling take the form of a governmental technology now? With
this question, we echo what is asked in the introduction to this special
issue: why now? Consider in this light the economic analysis of Mariana
Mazzucato. She details how the historical field of political economy was sur-
passed by the narrower discipline of economy, which turned in the process
from objective measures of value (such as a labour theory of value as
measured by the amount of labour necessary to produce a commodity) to
subjective ones (especially the theory of marginal utility as measured by
price, or what so many individual customers are willing to pay for some-
thing).161 This subjective shift in economic reason dovetails with the
elevation of the individual, or the abstracted individual engaged at the
scale of the transacting population. And as Mazzucato makes clear, it estab-
lishes the possibility of comprehending material value creation in purely
speculative exercises that produce no new goods.162 The washing machine
has a value measured in price, as does the packaging and repackaging of
debt accrued in the purchase of the washing machine, or a bet on the like-
lihood that the repackaged debt will be worth more or less over time.
Under mainstream, marginal utility (or equilibrium) economic theory, the
achievement of value objectively becomes indistinguishable from possibili-
ties of gain by speculative wager. The enjoyment of gambling thereby
becomes socially useful, elevating its performance in the register of risk to
a level appropriate to governance. But more than useful, it becomes socially
necessary, as constant conditions of always-intensifying competition ensure
that every next opportunity must be capitalised on. Indeed, as Leroy
argued, the new risk calculus needs to include the ‘risk of not acting’ – the
risk of missing out.
159 Cf Joan Copjec, Read my desire: Lacan against the historicists (MIT Press 1994). For cognate investi-
gations in other contexts into a materialized turn away from formal imperatives associated with
the oedipal complex.
160 Žižek (n 7) 241.
161 Mariana Mazzucato, The Value of Everything: Making and Taking in the Global Economy (Penguin,
2018).
162 Ibid
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In other words, survival is no longer an issue of guarding against contin-
gency, but the competitive requirement to exploit it. And so, risk not only
secures against the contingent, à la insurance in its classical form, risk also
capitalises on the contingent, for instance in the forms of finance associated
with speculation. The financial derivative, pervasive in the contemporary
transnational economy even since the global crash occasioned by the instru-
ment, is supposed to do both of these things at once, delivering surplus profit
while distributing the costs of failure. The same spirit of resilience-with-
profit was apparent above in the promise of ‘transformational rewards’
attendant on the embrace of risk-management in the legal practices of the
World Bank. More than anything else, as Dillon has observed elsewhere,
risk technologies ‘provide opportunity for gain or they compensate people
[and things] for any loss they may incur, allowing them to continue to actively
circulate in the general combinatorial and transactional economy of contin-
gency’ in the first place.163 Yet, to say that risk technologies allow activity
is misleading: the interlacing of legal regimes, financial instruments and
insurance practices, among other things, work together to enable and
ensure activity, whether to minimise negative exposure or to maintain
profit and growth in an endlessly competitive environment, one metastasised
today by predictive technologies capable of extracting and deploying massive
amounts of data to extend the scale and scope of speculative, risk-oriented
performance for governance (and other) purposes. In short, risk is constitu-
tive of institutional participation today in the endless competition that mate-
rially defines contemporary subjects in their interrelations.
Conclusion: un-governance and critique
We indicated earlier that we intend to contribute to a new mode of critique
suited to some of the distinct features that we associate with un-govern-
ance.164 Specifically, we are interested in a mode of critique attuned to the
productive performativity of this new mode of governance.165 We are not
especially interested in the failure of un-governance practices to ‘live up’
to any representational figure or promise. In part, this is because we are
not much convinced that un-governance actors are much interested any
more in representing any idealistic promise. Idealism figures into our two
empirical threads at the World Bank only in connection with Shihata, the
embodiment of our oedipal figure, who described a line between law and
politics that the World Bank’s legal counsel was bound by mandate not to
cross. That representation operated as a sort of constitutional (and
163 See Dillon (n 102) 327 (emphasis added).
164 See Žižek (n 19).
165 See Johns (n 15); Lang (n 22); Amoore (n 10).
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constitutive) limit, an ideal-type boundary mark projected back into the
identity of the legal counsel to define (and delimit) its practice.166 It also pro-
vided an object for critique. Leroy’s legal counsel, however, does not main-
tain that ideal boundary mark, nor the professional identity that it supports.
Under Leroy, the World Bank’s legal counsel is an opportunistic one, trained
on and for resilience and productivity, unbound from Shihata’s defining pro-
hibition. To be clear: by opportunistic, we do not mean (to be) cynical. And
that is the point. Leroy’s legal counsel is the wellness guru, aiming at vitality
rather than disciplinary identity. In this mode, it is adaptive, resilient and
productive, full stop. And it is resilient-productive (productive of and for
resilience) as part of a remarkable new development in a condition of gov-
ernance that calls for competitive productivity without any objects or ends
beyond competitive productivity itself. This development is what we associ-
ate with un-governance, in which there is diminished adherence to or
deployment of a false ideal(ism), diminished reliance on representations to
be failed in practice, but also diminished identification of or with any
unitary purpose.
The pursuit of closure persists, as it must in a condition of ever more com-
petition, because without the gesture of intended closure – the ambition to
win and not lose – the competitive pursuit collapses. But now it includes
an embrace of the impossibility of closure, the receding horizon that sustains
the perpetual competition in the first place. As a result, there remains only
the productivity, in a pressurised system that drives ever greater productivity,
and it is on this performance that we mean to train our critique. With our
contribution to this special issue, we have proposed a particular framework
by which to make specific institutional aspects of un-governance legible in
historical context. We have instantiated that framework and those insti-
tutional aspects with two developments at the World Bank. Comprehending
the productive reality of these practices has been our primary goal here, to
enable further critical investigation into their possibilities and discontents
going forward.
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